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Abstract
We propose three algorithms for the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in synchronous systems.
The first algorithm runs in min{3h(X) + 6, 6
√
fa + 6}) rounds and takes O(n2 min{h(X),
√
fa})
messages, where h(X) is the height of the input lattice X, n is the total number of processes in the
system, f is the maximum number of Byzantine processes such that n ≥ 3f + 1 and fa ≤ f is the
actual number of Byzantine processes in an execution. The second algorithm takes 3 log n + 3 rounds
and O(n2 log n) messages. The third algorithm takes 4 log f + 3 rounds and O(n2 log f) messages.
All algorithms can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine failures. This is the first work for the Byzantine lattice
agreement problem in synchronous systems which achieves logarithmic rounds. In our algorithms,
we apply a slightly modified version of the Gradecast algorithm given by Feldman et al [10] as a
building block. If we use the Gradecast algorithm for authenticated setting given by Katz et al [12],
we obtain algorithms for the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in authenticated settings and
tolerate f < n2 failures.
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1 Introduction
The lattice agreement problem, introduced by Attiya et al [2], is an important decision
problem in shared-memory and message passing systems. In this problem, processes start
with input values from a lattice and need to decide values which are comparable to each
other. Specifically, suppose each process i has input xi from a lattice (X, ≤, t) with the
partial order ≤ and the join operation t, it has to output a value yi also in X such that the
following properties are satisfied. 1) Downward-Validity: xi ≤ yi for each correct process
i. 2) Upward-Validity: yi ≤ t{xi | i ∈ [n]}. 3) Comparability: for any two correct
processes i and j, either yi ≤ yj or yj ≤ yi.
In shared-memory systems, algorithms for the lattice agreement problem can be directly
applied to solve the atomic snapshot problem [1, 2]. This was the initial motivation for
studying this problem. The application of lattice agreement in message passing systems has
been explored only recently. Failero et al [9] were the first to apply lattice agreement for
building a special class of linearizable replicated state machines, which can support query
operation and update operation, but not mixed query and update operation. Traditionally,
consensus based protocols are applied to build linearizable replicated state machines. However,
consensus based protocols do not provide deterministic termination guarantee in the presence
of failures in the system, since the consensus problem cannot be solved with even one failure
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in an asynchronous system [11]. The lattice agreement problem instead has been shown to be
a weaker decision problem than consensus. It can be solved in an asynchronous system when
a majority of processes is correct. Thus, linearizable replicated state machines built based on
lattice agreement protocols have the advantage of termination even with failures. Another
application of lattice agreement in distributed systems is to build atomic snapshot objects.
Efficient implementation of atomic snapshot objects in crash-prone asynchronous message
passing systems is important because they can make design of algorithms in such systems
easier. The paper [2] presents a general technique for applying algorithms for the lattice
agreement problem to solve the atomic snapshot problem. By using the same technique,
algorithms for lattice agreement problem in distributed systems can be directly applied to
implement atomic snapshot objects in crash-prone message passing systems. Essentially,
an atomic snapshot object needs to provide linearizabilty for all processes, which decides
on some total ordering of operations. In the lattice agreement problem, processes need to
output values which lie in a chain of the input lattice, which is also a total ordering.
The lattice agreement problem in crash failure model has been studied both in synchronous
and asynchronous systems. In synchronous systems, a log n rounds recursive algorithm based
on “branch-and-bound” approach is proposed by Attiya et al [2] with message complexity
of O(n2). The basic idea of their algorithm is to divide processes into two groups based
on ids and let processes in the first group send values to processes in the second group.
Each process in the second group takes join of received values. Then, this procedure
continues within each subgroup. Their algorithm can tolerate at most n− 1 process failures.
Later, the paper by Mavronicolasa et al [14] gave an algorithm with round complexity
of min{1 + h(X), b(3 +
√
8f + 1/2)c}, for any execution where at most f < n processes
may crash and h(X) denotes the height of the input lattice X. Their algorithm has the
early-stopping property and is the first algorithm with round complexity that depends on the
actual height of the input lattice. The best upper bound for the lattice agreement problem
in crash-failure model is given by Xiong et al [21], which is O(log f) rounds. The basic idea
of their algorithm is again to divide processes into two groups based height of received values
at each round and trying to achieve agreement within each group recursively.
In asynchronous systems, the lattice agreement problem was first studied by Faleiro et
al in [9]. They present a Paxos style protocol when a majority of processes are correct.
Their algorithm needs O(n) asynchronous rounds in the worst case. The basic idea of their
algorithm is to let each process repeatedly broadcast its current value to all at each round
and update its value to be the join of all received values until all received values at a certain
round are comparable with its current value. Later, Xiong et al [21] propose an algorithm
which improves the round complexity to O(f) rounds. For the best upper bound, Xiong
et al [20] present an algorithm for this problem with round complexity of O(log f), which
applies similar idea as [21] but with extra work to take care of possible arbitrary delay of
messages in asynchronous systems.
The Byzantine failure model was first considered by Lamport et al [13] for the study of the
Byzantine general agreement problem. For the lattice agreement problem in Byzantine failure
model, Nowak et al [15] give an algorithm for a variant of the lattice agreement problem
on cycle-free lattices that tolerates up to f < n(h(X)+1) Byzantine faults in asynchronous
systems, where h(X) is the height of the input lattice X. In their problem, the original
Downward-Validity and Upward-Validity requirement are replaced with a different validity
definition, which only requires that for each output value y of a correct process, there must
be some input value x of a correct process such that x ≤ y. With their validity definition,
however, corresponding algorithms are not suitable for applications in atomic snapshot
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objects and linearizable replicated state machines, since each process would like to have
their proposal value included its output value. A more closely related work is the preprint
by Di Luna et al [8], which proposes a reasonable validity condition and presents the first
algorithm for asynchronous systems. Their algorithm takes O(f) rounds. The basic idea
of their algorithm is to first use the asynchronous Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive
[5, 17] to let all correct processes disclose their input values to each other, based on which
each correct process constructs a set of safe values. This set of safe values are the only
values a correct process will possibly deliver in future rounds. After the disclosure phase,
the remaining steps are similar to the algorithms given in [9, 21] for the lattice agreement
problem in crash failure model, except that each process delivers a message only if all the
values included in it are contained in its safe value set. Our algorithms assume synchronous
systems but achieve exponential improvement in terms of round complexity.
For related works on application of lattice agreement, Faleiro et al [9] give procedures
to build a linearizable and serializable replicated state machine which only supports query
operation and update operation but not mixed queryte operation, based on lattice agreement
protocols. Later, Xiong et al [20] propose some optimizations for their procedure for
implementing replicated state machines in practice, specifically, they proposed a method
to truncate the logs maintained. The recent paper by Skrzypczak et al [16] improves the
procedure given in [9] in terms of memory consumption, at the expense of progress, and also
demonstrates higher throughput.
Our main contribution in this paper is summarized in Table 1. Our first algorithm is
early stopping because its round complexity depends on fa: the actual number of Byzantine
processes in an execution. Its basic idea is to let processes communicate using a modified
Gradecast primitive and detect Byzantine processes along the way. The second and third
algorithm are not early stopping but take logarithmic number of rounds. A building block of
both algorithms is to construct a classifier procedure as in [2, 3, 21, 20] using a variant of
the Gradecast primitive, but now the classifier procedure is Byzantine-tolerant and needs to
guarantee different properties.
Table 1 Our Results.
Problem Reference Rounds Resilience
BLA
Concurrent work [7] O(log f) f < n4
This paper
min{3h(X) + 6, 6
√
fa + 6}
f < n33 log n + 3
4 log f + 3
In a concurrent work by Di Luna et al [7], they show that the Byzantine lattice agreement
problem cannot be solved with f ≥ n3 failures in a synchronous systems. This shows that our
algorithms achieve optimal resilience. In their paper, they give an algorithm for this problem
which takes O(log f) rounds and tolerates f < n4 failures, whereas our algorithms tolerate
f < n3 failures. With the assumption of digital signatures, they can improve the resilience to
be f < n3 , whereas our algorithms tolerate f <
n
2 failures.
2 System Model and Problem Definition
System Model: We assume a distributed message system with n processes in a completely
connected topology, denoted as p1, ..., pn. Every process can send messages to every other
process. We consider synchronous systems, which means that message delays and the duration
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of the operations performed by the process have an upper bound on the time. We assume that
processes can have Byzantine failures but at most f < n/3 processes can be Byzantine in any
execution of the algorithm. We use parameter fa to denote the actual number of Byzantine
processes in a system. By our assumption, we must have fa ≤ f . Byzantine processes can
deviate arbitrarily from the algorithm. We say a process is correct or non-faulty if it is not
a Byzantine process. We use C to denote the set of correct processes in an execution. We
assume that the underlying communication system is reliable.
The Byzantine Lattice Agreement (BLA) Problem: Let (X, ≤, t) be a finite join semi-
lattice with the partial order ≤ and the join operation t. Two values u and v in X are
comparable iff u ≤ v or v ≤ u. The join of u and v is denoted as t{u, v}. X is a join
semi-lattice if the join exists for every nonempty finite subset of X. As customary in this
area, we use the term lattice instead of join semi-lattice in this paper for simplicity. More
background on join semi-lattices can be found in [6].
In the Byzantine lattice agreement problem, each process pi can propose a value xi in
X and must decide on some output yi also in X in the presence of at most f Byzantine
processes in the system. Let C denote the set of correct processes. Let fa denote the actual
number of Byzantine processes in the system. An algorithm is said to solve the Byzantine
lattice agreement problem if the following properties are satisfied:
Comparability: For all i ∈ C and j ∈ C, either yi ≤ yj or yj ≤ yi.
Downward-Validity: For all i ∈ C, xi ≤ yi.
Upward-Validity: t{yi | i ∈ C} ≤ t({xi | i ∈ C} ∪B), where B ⊂ X and |B| ≤ fa.
Remark: The Upward-Validity given by Attiya et al [2] is not suitable in the presence of
Byzantine processes, since the input value for a Byzantine process is not defined. Thus, the
extra B set is used to accommodate for possible values from Byzantine processes. The above
Upward-Validity is similar to the Non-Triviality defined in [8]. The only difference is that
the extra B set in [8] is required to have size at most f , which is the resilience parameter.
One may argue that if a Byzantine process proposes the largest element of the input lattice,
then correct processes may always decide on the largest element. For applications, we can
impose an additional constraint on the initial proposal of all processes. For example, in the
case of a Boolean lattice, we can require that the initial proposal for any process must be a
singleton. More generally, we can impose the requirement that the initial proposal of any
process must have the height less than some constant.
In this paper, for a given set V ⊆ X, we use L(V ) to denote the join-closed subset of X
that includes all elements in V . Clearly, L(V ) is also a join semi-lattice. The height of a
value v in a lattice X is defined as the length of longest chain from any minimal value to
v, denoted as hX(v) or h(v) when it is clear. The height of a lattice X is the height of its
largest value in this lattice, denoted as h(X). For two lattices L1 and L2, we use L1 ⊆ L2 to
mean that L1 is a sublattice of L2.
3 Early Stopping Algorithm for BLA
In this section, we present an early stopping algorithm for the BLA problem, which applies a
slightly modified version of the Gradecast algorithm given by Feldman et al [10] as a building
block. The algorithms takes min{3h(X) + 6, 6
√
fa + 6} rounds. Our algorithm has two
primary ingredients which are quite different from the algorithm given in [9, 21] for the crash
failure model. In the Byzantine failure model, correct processes can receive arbitrary values
from a Byzantine process. In order to guarantee Upward-Validity, we do not want correct
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processes to accept arbitrarily many values sent from a Byzantine process. The idea in [8] is
to construct a safe value set, which stores the values reliably broadcast by each process at
the first round. Later on, each process only delivers a received message if the values included
in this message are contained in its safe value set. In this way, correct processes would not
deliver arbitrary values sent by Byzantine processes. However, this idea can only provide
O(f) rounds guarantee.
To obtain the O(
√
fa) rounds guarantee, our first idea is to let each correct process in
our algorithm keep track of a lattice, which we call the safe lattice, instead of just a set
of values. At each round, each correct process ignores all values received which are not
contained in this safe lattice. By carefully updating this safe lattice of each correct process,
our algorithm ensures that the value sent from a correct process is always in the safe lattice
of any other correct process and Byzantine process cannot introduce arbitrary values to break
the Upward-Validity condition. To get the O(
√
fa) bound, another crucial ingredient of
our algorithm is to apply the Gradecast algorithm at each round to detect the Byzantine
processes which sends different values to different correct processes and let each correct
process ignores messages from these processes. This idea is used in [4] to solve the Byzantine
consensus problem in synchronous systems.
3.1 The Modified Gradecast Algorithm
Gradecast [10] is a three-round distributed algorithm that ensures some properties that
are similar to those of broadcast. The Gradecast procedure has two parameters. The first
one specifies the leader of the Gradecast and the second one represents the value that the
leader would like to send. The output of process i in the Gradecast of leader p is a triple
< p, vip, c
i
p > where vip is the value process i thinks the leader p has sent and cip is the score
assigned by i for the leader. The score assigned by process i for the leader is among {0, 1, 2}.
We say cip is the score assigned to the value or the leader by process i.
For our purpose, we do a slight modification of the Gradecast algorithm from [10] to
enable processes to filter out some invalid values received and ignore messages from known
Byzantine processes. The modified Gradecast algorithm can be found in out full paper [18].
We do the following modifications: 1) Let each process store a safe lattice to filter out all
received values which are not in the lattice. We call this lattice: the safe lattice. Specifically,
each process i keeps a safe value set, denoted as SVi. This set is updated by process i at
each round of the main algorithm. From SVi, each process i constructs L(SVi), the safe
lattice as the join-closed subset of X which includes all values in SVi. 2) Let each process
store a bad set, which stores the Byzantine processes known by this process. Each process
ignores the messages sent by processes in this set in the modified Gradecast algorithm. This
bad set is also updated at each round of the main algorithm.
We assume that a correct leader always gradecasts a value which lies in the safe lattice of
each correct process and the bad set of each correct process does not contain any correct
process. We will show that these assumptions hold when we invoke the modified Gradecast
algorithm as a substep in our main algorithm.
I Lemma 1. Assume that a correct leader always gradecast some value v which lies in the
safe lattice of each other correct process and the bad set of each correct process does not
contain a correct process. Then the modified Gradecast algorithm satisfies the following
properties.
1. If the leader p is non-faulty then vip = v and cip = 2, for any non-faulty i;
2. For every non-faulty i and j: if cip > 0 and cjp > 0 then vip = vjp;
3. |cip − cjp| ≤ 1 for every non-faulty i and j.
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3.2 The Main Algorithm
The main algorithm, shown in Alg. 1, runs in synchronous rounds. For ease of presentation,
we use rounds to mean the iterations in the for loop of the main algorithm. We call the
rounds taken by the Gradecast step as sub-rounds. We assume for now that there is an upper
bound F on the number of rounds of the main algorithm. We will establish the accurate
value of F later and show that each process must decide on an output by round F . Initially,
the bad set Bi and the safe value set SVi for each process i are empty. Process i regards any
value received as valid in the gradecast of the first round.
Algorithm 1 Early Stopping Algorithm for the BLA Problem.
Algorithm for Process i:
vi := xi //value held by i during the algorithm Bi := ∅ //set of faulty processes known
by process i
SVi := ∅ //set of safe values for process i
1: for r := 1 to F // F is an upper bound on the number of rounds
2: Gradecast(i, vi)
3: Let < j, uj , cj > denote that process j gradecast uj with score cj
4: Define U1i := {uj | < j, uj , cj > ∧ cj ≥ 1, j ∈ [n]},
U2i := {uj | < j, uj , cj > ∧ cj = 2, j ∈ [n]}
5: Set Bi := Bi ∪ {j | < j, ∗, cj > ∧ cj ≤ 1, j ∈ [n]}
6: Set SVi := U1i
7: if vi comparable with each value in U2i then decide on vi, but continue execution
8: Set vi := t{u | u ∈ U2i }
9: endfor
At each round, each process invokes the modified Gradecast algorithm with its current
value and acts as the leader. So there are at least n − f Gradecast instances running at
each round, with each instance corresponding to one correct process. After the Gradecast
phase, each process i has a set of triples, one for each process which invoked Gradecast as
the leader. A triple consists of the leader id, the value sent by the leader, and the score
assigned by i. From these triples, processes i updates its bad set Bi and safe value set SVi as
follows. At line 5, process i includes all processes which are assigned score at most one into
its bad set Bi and ignores all messages sent from processes in Bi at future rounds. Process i
also updates its safe value set SVi to be the union of all values gradecast by processes with
score at least one. By updating the safe value set in this way, we can ensure that the current
value of a correct process is in the safe lattice of every other correct process. Thus, the value
gradecast by a correct process in the next round is valid for every other correct process,
which implies property 1 of Gradecast. On the other hand, this safe value set also prevents
Byzantine processes from gradecasting an arbitrary value, i.e, Byzantine processes can only
gradecast values that belong to the safe lattice.
For the deciding condition at line 7, each process decides on its current value at a certain
round if all values gradecast by processes with score 2 are comparable with its current value.
A process keeps executing the algorithm even if it has decided on an output. It updates its
current value to be the join of all values gradecast with score 2 and starts the next round.
3.3 Correctness and Complexity
We now prove the correctness of our algorithm. Due to space limitation, we put the proof
of most lemmas and theorems in our full paper [18]. The variables used for the proof are
defined in Table 2. The main algorithm has the following properties.
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Table 2 Notations for the Proof of Correctness of the Early Stopping Algorithm.
Variable Definition
vri Value of process i at the end of round r
vr
Auxiliary variable. The join of values of all correct processes at the end of round r,
i.e., vr := t{vri | i ∈ C}
SV ri The safe value set held by process i at the end of round r
Sr
Auxiliary variable. The union of all safe value sets held by correct processes
at the end of round r, i.e, Sr = ∪{SV ri | i ∈ C}
sr Auxiliary variable. The join of all values in Sr, i.e, sr = t{v | v ∈ Sr}
cij The score process i assigned to process j in the Gradecast with j as the leader.
I Lemma 2. Let i and j be any two correct processes. For any 1 ≤ r ≤ F , the main
algorithm satisfies the properties below.
(p1) vri ∈ L(SV rj ) (p2) vr ∈ L(SV ri ) (p3) vr ≤ sr (p4) vr−1i < vri if process i is
undecided at the end of round r
(p5) vr < vr+1 if at least one correct process is not decided at the end of round r
(p6) L(Sr+1) ⊆ L(Sr) (p7) sr+1 ≤ sr (p8) For each correct process i, its bad set Bi
never contains a correct process (p9) vr ≤ vr+1i
Property (p1) and (p8) immediately justify the assumption in Lemma 1. Thus, all
properties of Gradecast are satisfied. Property (p3) indicates that the join of all values of
correct processes is less than the join of all values in the safe value sets of all correct processes
at any round. Property (p4) and (p5) imply that the join of all values of correct processes is
strictly increasing. Property (p7), implied by (p6), indicates that the join of all values in
the safe value sets of all correct processes is non-increasing. Then, we must have vr = sr at
some round r. After this round, the deciding condition must be satisfied for each process.
Now we show the algorithm satisfies all the properties required by the BLA problem. For
now we assume that each process decides within F rounds. We show the accurate value of F
when we analyze the round complexity.
I Lemma 3. The values decided by correct processes satisfy all the properties of BLA.
Proof. (Sketch) Comparability. If two processes decide at the same round, their decision
value must be comparable by the deciding condition. Otherwise, the process decides in a
later round must receive the decision value of the other process.
Upward-Validity. The safe lattice kept by each process guarantees that each Byzantine
process can introduce at most one value into the decision value of correct processes. J
We now analyze the round and message complexity of our algorithm. The following
lemma along with property (p5) and (p7) of Lemma 2 guarantees the termination of our
algorithm. It can be derived from (p1), (p7), and (p9) of Lemma 2 and the decision condition.
I Lemma 4. If vr = sr at the end of some round r, then all undecided correct processes
decide in at most 2 rounds.
I Lemma 5. F ≤ h(X) + 2, where X is the input lattice and h(X) is the height of X.
Proof. (Sketch) (p3), (p5) and (p7) of Lemma 2 implies that vr = sr in at most h(X) rounds.
Then, Lemma 4 implies that F ≤ h(X) + 2. J
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We now show that the algorithm takes O(
√
f) rounds. We first observe that if a process
is in the bad set of each correct process, then its gradecast will be graded with score 0 by
each correct process. We introduce the notion of terrible processes. A process is terrible at
round r if it is graded with score 2 by at least one correct process in each round before r and
no correct process grades it with score 2 at round r. From the above definition, we observe
that the terrible processes at each round are included into Bi for each correct i at line 5 of
the algorithm. So, a Byzantine process can be terrible at most once.
I Lemma 6. Suppose there are fr terrible processes at round r, then each process decides
within r + fr + 2 rounds.
I Lemma 7. F ≤ 2
√
f + 2, where f is the maximum number of Byzantine failures in the
system such that n ≥ 3f + 1.
Proof. Consider the first
√
f rounds. At least one of these rounds has less than
√
f terrible
processes. By Lemma 6, starting from that round, each undecided process needs at most√
f + 2 more rounds to decide. Thus, the total number of rounds is at most 2
√
f + 2. J
The obtain the O(
√
fa) rounds guarantee, we let each correct process dynamically update
its termination round, which denotes the round number such that a correct process terminates
the algorithm in any case. Specifically, if a process includes t Byzantine processes into its
bad set, then this process runs
√
t + 2 more rounds and terminate.
I Theorem 8. There is a min{3h(X) + 6, 6
√
fa + 6}) rounds algorithm for the Byzantine
lattice agreement problem in synchronous systems, which can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine
failures. fa is the actual number of Byzantine failures. The term h(X) is the height of the
input lattice X. The algorithm takes O(n2 min{h(X),
√
fa}) messages.
I Corollary 9. There is a min{4h(X) + 8, 8
√
fa + 8} rounds algorithm for the authenticated
(allow digital signatures) BLA problem in synchronous systems, which can tolerate f < n2
Byzantine failures. The algorithm takes O(n2 min{h(X),
√
fa}) messages.
Proof. Using the 4-round Gradecast algorithm [12] in the authenticated setting that tolerates
f < n2 Byzantine failures immediately gives the result. J
4 O(log n) Rounds Algorithm for the BLA problem
The 3 log n + 3 round algorithm shown in this section is inspired by algorithms proposed for
the crash failure model in [2, 21]. The basic idea is to divide a group of processes into the
slave subgroup and the master subgroup based on process ids, and ensure the property that
the value of any correct process in the slave group is at most the value of any correct process
in the master group. With the above property, if we recurse within each subgroup, then all
correct processes can obtain comparable values in O(log n) rounds.
In the Byzantine failure model, however, simply ensuring the above property is not
enough. For example, suppose we divided a group of processes G into the slave group S(G)
and the master group M(G) such that the above property is satisfied. Suppose there is a
Byzantine process in S(G), it might send a value to some correct process in S(G) in a later
round such that the value is not known by correct processes in M(G). Then, a correct slave
process might have a value which is greater than some master process.
In order to prevent such cases, our algorithm introduces two novel ideas. First, when
we divide a group into the slave subgroup and the master subgroup, we apply a modified
Gradecast algorithm to guarantee that the value of a slave process is at most the value
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of a master process. The Gradecast algorithm serves the same purpose as the Classifier
procedure as given in [21, 20]. A nice property of the modified Gradecast algorithm is that if
some correct process assigns score 2 for the value gradecast by the leader, then each other
correct process assigns score at least 1 for this value. Suppose we let each process in a group
gradecast its value. Let U2 denote the set of values assigned score of 2 by some correct
process. Let U1 denote the set of values assigned score of at least 1 by some correct process.
Then, we must have U2 ⊆ U1. If each process in the master group updates their value to U1
and each process in the slave group updates their value to U2, then it is guaranteed that the
set of all values of the slave group is a subset of the values of each master process.
However, the above property is only guaranteed at the current recursion level. Suppose
there is a Byzantine process in the slave group, then it can gradecast a new value, which
is not contained in the value set of some master process, to correct processes in the slave
group. Then, the above property that the value of any correct slave process is at most the
value of any correct master process does not hold any more. We need to ensure that the
values of all slave processes are always a subset of the values of each master process when
the recursion within each subgroup continues. To achieve that, we introduce a second novel
idea. We let each process keep track of a safe value set for each other process and regard any
value received from that process but not in the safe value set as invalid. This is also different
from the algorithm in previous section, where each process just keeps track of one single safe
lattice for all. These safe values sets are used to restrict what values a process in a slave
group can send. If we can guarantee that the union of all safe value sets for processes in the
slave group is a subset of the value set of each master process, then we can ensure that the
above property continues to hold.
4.1 The SetGradecast Algorithm
In the 3 log n + 3 rounds algorithm, a process needs to gradecast a set of values instead of
just one single value. Thus, we propose the SetGradecast algorithm (presented in the full
paper [18]) which is similar to the Gradecast algorithm, except that it is used to gradecast
a set of values. In the 3 log n + 3 rounds algorithm, each process i keeps track of a safe array
Si of size n with Si[j] being a safe value set for process j. Process i considers a value v
received from process j as valid if v ∈ Si[j], otherwise invalid. Process i uses Si to filter out
invalid values received from any process in the SetGradecast algorithm. We show how to
construct and update the safe value array for each process in the main algorithm.
In the SetGradecast algorithm, we assume that the leader needs to gradecast a set of
distinct values, which can be guaranteed by introducing some unique tags for each value. If
a process receives a message which contains duplicate values from some leader, the leader
must be Byzantine. It just ignores the message. Each process i returns a triple < j, Rj , Cj >
when process j invokes the SetGradecast as the leader. The set Rj is the set of values
gradecast by process j with score at least 1 and the map Cj stores the score assigned by
process i for each value in Rj . Let v be an arbitrary value gradecast by the leader. Let civ
denote the score of v assigned by process i. Then, we have the following lemma.
I Lemma 10. Algorithm SetGradecast has the following properties.
1. If a value v gradecast by a correct leader i is in the safe value set of each correct process
j for i, i.e., v ∈ Sj [i] for each correct j ∈ [n], then the score of v assigned by each correct
j must be 2, i.e., cjv = 2.
2. Let v be an arbitrary value gradecast by the leader. Then |civ − cjv| ≤ 1 for any two correct
process i and j.
3. If a value v gradecast by a leader i is not in the safe value set of any correct process for i,
i.e., v 6∈ Sj [i] for any j ∈ C, then cjv = 0 for each j ∈ C.
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Algorithm 2 The 3 log n + 3 Rounds Algorithm for the BLA Problem.
Let Gr denote the collection of groups at round r, initially G1 = {G1}
xi: input value for process i Vi: value set of process i with Vi := {xi} initially.
Si: an array of size n with Si[j] being the safe value set for process j.
1: for each process i, in parallel do /* Build the Initial Safe Array */
2: Process i invokes Gradecast(i, xi)
3: Let < j, vj , cj > denote the tuple obtained from the gradecast of pj
4: Set Si[k] := {vj | cj ≥ 1, j ∈ [n]} for each process k ∈ [n]
5: endfor
6: for r := 1 to log n
7: Divide each group G ∈ Gr into the slave subgroup S(G) and the master subgroup
M(G) based on process ids
8: Let Gr+1 denote the collection of new groups
9: Each slave process p executes SetGradecast(p, Vp)
10: for each process i, in parallel do
11: Let < j, V alij , Cij > denote the leader-value-score triple that pi obtained for pj
12: Let Rij denote the set of values assigned score 2 by pi in the gradecast of pj ,
i.e, Rij := {v ∈ V alij | Cij [v] = 2}
13: for each group G ∈ Gr










16: Si[j] := U2 for each process j ∈ S(G)
17: Si[j] := Si[j] ∪ U1 for each process j ∈M(G),
18: if i ∈ S(G) then Vi := U2




23: Output yi := t{v ∈ Vi}
4.2 The Main Algorithm
The 3 log n + 3 rounds algorithm is shown in Alg. 2. In the algorithm, each process i stores a
value set Vi which is updated at each round. Initially, Vi = {xi}. Each process i keeps track
of a safe array Si of size n with Si[j] being the safe value set for j. Process i regards any
value received from j which is not in Si[j] as invalid and thus ignores it. Different processes
may have different safe value sets for a process j. Initially, all processes are in the same
group, denoted as G1. During the algorithm, processes might be divided into different groups.
The algorithm proceeds as follows.
The initial round at lines 1-5 is used to build the initial safe array of each process i. At
this round, each process i invokes the Gradecast algorithm to send its input value xi to all.
Each process i constructs the same initial safe value set for each process j, which includes all
values gradecast by some process and assigned score of at least 1 by process i. We will show
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later that this initial round of gradecast guarantees Upward-Validity of the BLA problem.
Intuitively, this is because each Byzantine process can only introduce one value into the safe
value sets by properties of Gradecast.
In lines 6-22, at each round r from 1 to log n, each group G is divided into two subgroups:
the slave group S(G) and the master group M(G), where S(G) contains all processes in
G with ids in the lower half and M(G) contains all processes in G with ids in the upper
half. Each process in S(G) invokes SetGradecast to gradecast its current value set to all
processes. Processes in M(G) do not gradecast their value sets. After this step, for each
group G, process i obtains a set of values gradecast by processes in S(G). From line 13 to
line 20, process i updates its safe value set Si and its value set Vi based the values obtained in
all SetGradecast instances. At line 16, process i updates its safe value set for each process
j ∈ S(G) to be the values gradecast with score 2 by some process in S(G). At line 17, it
updates the safe value set for each process in M(G) to be the values gradecast with score
at least 1 by some process in S(G). If process i is a slave process in S(G), it updates its
value set to be the set of values gradecast by processes in S(G) and assigned score of 2. If it
is a master process in M(G), it updates its value set to be the set of values gradecast by
processes in S(G) with score at least 1.
Table 3 Notations for the Proof of Correctness of the O(log n) Algorithm.
Variable Definition
V ri The value set held by process i at the end of round r.
Sri The safe value array of i at the end of round r.
SF rj
Auxiliary variable. The union of the safe value sets of all correct process
for j at the end of round r, i.e., SF rj := {Sri [j] | i ∈ C}
SF rG
Auxiliary variable. The union of the safe value sets of all correct process




4.3 Correctness and Complexity
Now we analyze the correctness and complexity of our algorithm. For any group G, let S(G)
and M(G) denote the slave group and the master group obtained when dividing G. The
variables we use for analysis are given in Table 3. Detailed proof of lemmas can be found in
our full paper [18].
I Lemma 11. Let G be a group that is divided into S(G) and M(G) at round r. Then
(p1) SF rS(G) ⊆ SF
r−1
G (p2) SF rM(G) ⊆ SF
r−1
G (p3) For each i ∈ G ∩ C, V ri ⊆ SF
r−1
G
The following lemma shows that if a value of correct process i is contained in the safe
value set of each correct process for process i, then this value remains in the value set of
process i. It also implies Downward-Validity.
I Lemma 12. Consider an arbitrary value v ∈ V rj of correct process j. If it is contained
in Sri [j] for each correct process i, then we have (1) v ∈ Sti [j] for each correct process i and
t ≥ r. (2) v ∈ V tj for any t ≥ r.
The following lemma shows that the union of all safe value sets of correct processes for
slave processes will always be a subset of the values of each master process.
I Lemma 13. Let G be a group which is divided into S(G) and M(G) at round r. Then
SF rS(G) ⊆ V
t
j for each correct j ∈M(G) and any round number t ≥ r.
DISC 2020
32:12 Byzantine Lattice Agreement in Synchronous Message Passing Systems
I Theorem 14. There is a 3 log n + 3 rounds algorithm for the Byzantine lattice agreement
problem in synchronous systems, which can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine failures. The algorithm
takes O(n2 log n) messages.
Proof. (Sketch) Comparability. Let G denote the last group both i and j belong to at
round r. W.l.o.g, suppose i ∈ S(G) and j ∈M(G). By (p1), (p2) and (p3) of Lemma 11, we
have V log ni ⊆ SF rS(G). Lemma 13 implies that SF rS(G) ⊆ V
log n





Upward-Validity. The initial round ensures that each Byzantine process can introduce
at most one value into the initial safe value sets of correct processes. J
I Corollary 15. There is a 4 log n + 4 rounds algorithm for the authenticated BLA problem
in synchronous systems which can tolerate f < n2 Byzantine failures, where n is the number
of processes. The algorithm takes O(n2 log n) messages.
5 O(log f) Algorithm for the BLA Problem
In this section, we present an algorithm for the BLA problem which takes 4 log f + 3
synchronous rounds. The O(log f) algorithm by Xiong et al. in [21] for the crash failure
model uses a crash-tolerant classifier procedure. The idea of using a classifier procedure to
obtain comparable views is initially applied to implement atomic snapshot objects in shared
memory systems by Attiya et al. [3]. Their crash-tolerant classifier procedure divides a group
of processes into two subgroups: the master group and the slave group based on a threshold
parameter k and guarantees the following properties. (C1) The value of any slave process
≤ the value of any master process. (C2) The value of any master process has height in the
input lattice > k. (C3) The join of all slave values has height ≤ k.
With the above properties, the classifier procedure can be recursively applied within
each subgroup and all processes have comparable values after O(log f) rounds by setting the
knowledge threshold k in a binary way as follows. Initially, all processes are in the same
group with initial knowledge threshold n− f2 . Consider a group G at level r with knowledge
threshold k, then the slave group of G has knowledge threshold k − f2r+1 and the master
group of G has knowledge threshold k + f2r+1 . If all processes exchange their values before
recursively invoking the classifier procedure, each correct process must have at least n− f
values and have at most n values. Then, after log f levels of recursion, by applying property
(C1) and (C2) recursively, all processes in different groups must have comparable values and
all processes in the same group must have the same value.
The crash-tolerant classifier procedure in [21] is quite simple. All processes within the
same group exchange their current values. If a process obtains a value set with size greater
than k, it is classified as a master. Otherwise, it is classified as a slave. A slave process keeps
its value unchanged. A master process updates its value to be the join of all values received.
In presence of Byzantine processes, however, properties (C1)-(C3) are not sufficient for
subgroups to invoke the classifier procedure recursively due to the following reason. Even if
we can guarantee (C1) and (C3) at the current classifier, Byzantine processes can introduce
additional values into the slave group when processes in the slave subgroup invokes the
classifier within themselves. Then, properties (C1) and (C3) can be violated.
In our algorithm, we apply a Byzantine-tolerant classifier procedure to divide a group of
processes into two subgroups: the slave group and the master group. A group of processes
apply the Byzantine-tolerant classifier procedure to update their value sets and decide which
subgroup they are classified into. In our algorithm, each process i keeps track of a value
set Vi: a set of values, which is updated in the classifier procedure. Similar to the O(log n)
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algorithm, we let each process store a safe value set for each group which restricts the values
that processes in this group can send. If SF is the union of the safe value sets of all correct
processes for the slave group, then, our algorithm guarantees that the value set of any slave
process must be always a subset of SF . The following properties are guaranteed after a
group of processes invoke the Byzantine-tolerant classifier procedure within themselves. (B1)
The union of the safe value sets of all correct processes for the slave group is a subset of the
value set of a master process. (B2) The value set of any master process has size > k. (B3)
The union of the safe value sets of all correct processes for the slave group has size ≤ k.
Property (B1) guarantees that the value set of a slave process is always a subset of the
value set of a master process starting from the point when they are classified into different
subgroups. For property (B3), our algorithm maintains the following variant: a value is
considered as valid by a correct process if it is in the safe value set of some correct process.
Thus, property (B3) restricts what values a group of processes can ever send, which are also
the values processes in the group can ever have (will be more clear in our algorithm).
To guarantee (B1) and (B2), similar to the O(log n) algorithm, we use the SetGradecast
algorithm as a communication primitive and update the safe value sets of correct processes
carefully. To guarantee (B3), dividing into the slave subgroup and the master subgroup in
our algorithm is based on the safe value sets of processes.
From property (B1) and (B3), we can observe that the Byzantine-tolerant classifier
procedure for a group of processes depends on not only processes in the group but also other
processes in the system (via the safe value sets). Thus, in our presentation, we do not present
the Byzantine-tolerant classifier procedure as a separate procedure, instead we present it
inside the main algorithm and call it as a classification step.
In the O(log n) algorithm, we divide a group into slave subgroup and master subgroup
based on process ids. A Byzantine process cannot lie about its group identity, i.e., whether
it is in the slave group or the master group. In the O(log f) algorithm, the classification is
based on the values received at each round. So, process i does not know whether process j is
classified as a slave or a master at any given round. Thus, a Byzantine process can lie about
its group identity and the O(log f) algorithm needs a mechanism to prevent such lies. In the
O(log f) algorithm, each process i ∈ [n] has a label li, which serves as the threshold when it
performs the classification step and also indicates its group identity. We require that when a
process sends a value, it needs to attach its label.
We formally define a group as a set of processes which have the same label. The label of
a group is the label of the processes in this group. The label of a group is also the threshold
value processes in this group use to do classification. We also use label to indicate a group.
We say a process is in group k if its value is associated with label k. Initially all processes
are within the same group with label k0 = n− f2 .
Consider the classification step for group G with label k. There are two main differences
between the O(log n) algorithm and the O(log f) algorithm. First, in the O(log n) algorithm,
only processes in the slave group of G invoke the gradecast primitive to send its current
value set. In the O(log f) algorithm, all processes in group G invoke the gradecast primitive.
Second, in the O(log n) algorithm, the classification is based on process ids. In the O(log f)
algorithm, we let each process send its safe value set for group G to all processes in G and
each process in G performs classification based on the safe sets received. If the union of the
received safe sets has size > k, the process is classified as a master, otherwise as a slave.
Each slave process updates its value to be the set of values with score 2. Each master process
updates its value to be the union of its current value and the set of values with score at least
1. The safe value set is updated in a similar manner to the O(log n) algorithm.
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Algorithm 3 The 4 log f + 3 Rounds Algorithm for the BLA Problem.
xi: input value for process i Vi: value set of process i. Vi := {xi} initially.
Initially all process are within the same group with label k0 = n− f2
li: label of pi. li := k0 = n− f2 initially and is updated at each round
Map Fi, with Fi[k] being the safe value set for processes with label k.
1: for each process i, in parallel do /* Build the Initial Safe Map and Value Set */
2: Execute Gradecast(i, xi)
3: Let < j, vj , cj > denote that process j gradecasts vj with score cj
4: Set Fi[k0] := {vj | cj ≥ 1 ∧ j ∈ [n]} // safe set for the initial group with label k0
5: Set Vi := {vj | cj = 2 ∧ j ∈ [n]}
6: endfor
7: for r := 1 to log f
8: for each process i, in parallel do
9: Execute SetGradecast(i, Vi, li)
10: Let L denote the set of labels received in all Gradecasts
11: for each label k ∈ L /* Each label represents a group */
/* Lines 12-21 is the classification step for group k */
12: Let Uki,1 denote the set of values with label k and assigned score ≥ 1 by pi.
13: Let Uki,2 denote the set of values with label k and assigned score 2 by pi
14: Set Fi[m(k, r)] := Fi[k] ∪ Uki,1 and Fi[s(k, r)] := Uki,2
15: Send Uki,2 to processes who gradecast with label k.
16: if li = k //if my label is k
17: Let Rj denote the set of values received from pj at line 15
18: Set T := ∪{Rj | Rj ⊆ Uki,1, j ∈ [n]}
19: /* Classification */
20: if |T | > k then Vi := Uki,1, li := li +
f
2r+1 //master process






25: yi := t{v ∈ V log f+1i }
In the O(log f) algorithm, each process i ∈ [n] keeps track of a safe value map Fi with Fi[k]
being the safe value set of process i for group k, i.e., Fi[k] is an upper bound on the values
with label k that process i considers valid. Define s(k, r) = k − f2r+1 and m(k, r) = k +
f
2r+1 .
The algorithm is shown in Alg. 3.
In lines 1-6 of the algorithm, each process first invokes Gradecast to send its input value
to all. Then, it constructs its value set as the set of values gradecast with score 2 and its
initial safe value set for the initial group as the set of values gradecast with score at least 1.
Lines 1-6 serve two purposes: 1) To construct the safe value set for the initial group with
label k0 = n− f2 and ensure that each Byzantine process can introduce at most one value
in the safe value sets 2) Ensure that there are at most f values unknown to each correct
processes. Then, log f recursion levels suffice for all processes to obtain comparable values.
In lines 7-25, at each round, each process invokes SetGradecast to send its current value
to all and performs classification. When a process invokes the SetGradecast to send its
current value set, its current label is attached. After the gradecast step, for each process
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j ∈ [n], process i obtains a value-score-label triple from the gradecast of process j. Then,
process i executes line 11-15 for each group at the current round. Specifically, for the group
with label k, process i obtains the set of values with score at least 1, Uki,1, and the set of
values with score 2, Uki,2, from the gradecast of processes with label k. Then, process i
updates its safe value set for group m(k, r), i.e., the master group of group k, to be the union
of its safe value set for group k and Uki,1. It also updates its safe value set for group s(k, r),
i.e., the slave group, to be Uki,2. Due to property 2 of SetGradecast, we must have Uki,2 ⊆ Ukj,1
for any process i and j. This step is to ensure that if a master process j obtains a value in
Uki,2, this value will be in the safe value set of each correct process for j. Then, when the
master process tries to send this value using SetGradecast, it must be assigned score of 2 by
each correct process, due to property 3 of SetGradecast. At line 15, process i sends its safe
value set for the slave group to the processes in group k.
Lines 16-21 are only executed by processes in group k. They obtain the set of values
sent by all processes at line 15 and do classification based the size of this set. To prevent
a Byzantine process from sending arbitrary values at line 15, each process in group k only
accepts the set Rj from process j if Rj is a subset of Uki,1. If process j is correct, this
condition must hold by property 2 of SetGradecast. So the sets sent from correct processes
will always be accepted. Then, the set T at line 18 must contain all the sets sent from correct
processes. Since each such set is the safe value set of a process for the slave group, each
process in group k is actually doing classification based on the safe sets of processes for the
slave group. Lines 20-21 is the classification step. If the size of T is greater than k, then the
process is classified as a master and updates its value to be the set of values gradecast by
processes in group k with score at least 1. Otherwise, its value is updated to be the set of
values gradecast by processes in group k with score 2. Its label is updated based on whether
the process is a master or a slave.
Due to space limitation, we put the correctness proof and complexity analysis in our full
paper [18]. Our main result is summarized in the following Theorem.
I Theorem 16. There is a 4 log f + 3 rounds algorithm for the BLA problem in synchronous
systems which can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine failures. It takes O(n
2 log f) messages.
I Corollary 17. There is a 5 log f + 4 rounds algorithm for the authenticated BLA problem




We have presented three algorithms for the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in syn-
chronous systems. The first algorithm has early stopping property. The second algorithms
take logarithmic rounds. The O(log f) rounds upper bound matches the bound for the crash
failure setting. For future work, the following questions are interesting: 1) Can we improve
the upper bound or prove some lower bound on the round complexity? 2) Can we solve the
BLA problem in asynchronous systems in logarithmic rounds? We have some partial results
in [19], but the algorithm proposed can only tolerate f < n5 Byzantine failures.
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